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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
LEWIS BANKS, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,

Case No.
12923

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Lewis Banks, Jr., appeals from a
decision of the Third Judicial District Court, denying
his release from the Utah State Prison upon a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On December 30, 1971, appellant filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that his commitment
to the Utah State Prison was invalid. The petition was
denied at the hearing held March 2, 1972. On the appel-
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lant's motion, the case was reopened and additional evidence received, May 23, 1972, at which time the petition
was again denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the denial of appellant's
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Third District
Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 30, 1970, Lewis Banks, Jr., in the Thlrd
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, pled guilty to the crime of forgery. The
court did not have a formal bindover from the City
Court, but upon stipulation of counsel it was agreed that
Mr. Banks could be arraigned and enter a plea to the
charge (Exhibit 1-P, p. 3, R. 40). Mr. Banks was represented during this time by Mr. Jay D. Edmonds. He
was explained and understood his right to a preliminary
hearing, a trial by jury, and the nature and consequences
of his crime and plea (Exhibit 1-P, pp. 4-7). He understood that as a result of his plea another charge pending
against him would be dismissed (Exhibit 1-P, p. 7). He
was not coerced by any threats or promises but voluntarily waived the above-mentioned rights in entering his
guilty plea (Exhibit 1-P, p. 7). The court took it upon
itself to make sure the above mentioned facts were true
and concluded that:
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"... the plea of guilty ... is made freely and voluntarily, intelligently, after consultation with his
attorney and with the understanding of his constitutional rights that he was not incriminating
right to trial by jury, right to confront
witnesses and cross-examine them in court before
him, and based upon that finding, the court directs
the defendant's guilty plea to the charge contained
in this information be entered" (Exhibit 1-P, p. 8).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE TRIAL
C 0 UR T DID HAVE JURISDICTION TO
ACCEPT APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY.
The appellant seeks to have his conviction declared
void on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
The basis for this allegation is that the transcript from
the City Court was not before the District Court when
the information was filed. Under Utah Code Ann. § 7715-32 ( 1953) , this transcript is supposed to be filed with
the clerk of the District Court within five days from the
time that the determination is made that the defendant
is to be held to answer for the crime charged.
"When the magistrate has discharged the defendant or has held him to answer he must within
five days, return to the clerk of the district court
the warrant, if any, the complaint and the depositions, if any; ... "
Not until this procedure has been followed, binding-over
the defendant to the District Court, can an information
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properly be filed. State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 131, 71
P. 2d 196, 199 (1937).
It is clear from the record, however, that appellant
has failed to prove that the transcript was not in the
hands of the District Court at the time the information
was filed. The only evidence produced to substantiate
appellant's claim, was the testimony of John Dearman
of the Salt Lake County Clerk's office. Mr. Dearman
testified there was some irregularity in the order of filing
of the documents with regard to appellant's case (R. 60).
Mr. Dearman, however, had no specific recollection of
the matter (R. 60) . The lower court held such evidence
to be speculative and inconclusive (R. 3).

Appellant also claims that the bind-over to the District Court was improper because the signature of the
City Court judge did not appear on the complaint as
required in Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19 (1953).

"If it appears from the examination that a public
offense has been committed and that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate must indorse on the complaint
an order, signed by him, ... "
Clearly this non-compliance is not grounds for refusing
jurisdiction to the District Court. State v. Laris, 78 Utah
183, 196, 2 P. 2d 243, 249 (1931).
". . . although the order holding the defendant to
answer in the district court was not indorsed on
the complaint, such an order had been made and
entered by him in his docket with the other proceedings had in the case, and a transcript of the
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docket duly certified to by the justice of the peace
was filed with the complaint and other papers in
the case in the district court. This was held in
the case of State v. Crook, 16 Utah 212, 51P.1091,
to be a sufficient compliance with the statute in
question. These assignments are without merit."
Id.
While appellant argues that for State v. Laris to
apply other requirements must be met, namely transferring a transcript to the District Court, he is unable
to show that such a requirement was not met. Therefore,
his claim that the bind-over was improper under Utah
Code Ann. § 77-15-19 (1953), is unsupported.
From the foregoing, respondent submits that the
lower court's decision was correct and that the appellant
has failed to meet his burden of proof in showing that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Maxwell v. Turner,
20 Utah 2d 163, 435 P. 2d 287 (1967).
"Proceedings in habeas corpus are generally regarded as civil in nature and consequently follow
the same rules of procedure as in other civil actions. In the original trial the burden is on the
petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence facts which will entitle him to relief. On
appeal recognition is given to the prerogatives
and the advantaged position of the trial court. His
findings and judgment are indulged a presumption of correctness. It is our duty to survey the
evidence in the light most favorable to them and
not to upset them if they find any substantial
support in the evidence." Id. at 165, 288.

POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANT
ENTERED HIS GUILTY PLEA INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY.
In Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 90 S. Ct.
1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1970), the court discussed the
standards of a guilty plea which is given voluntarily and
intelligently.
To be voluntary a guilty plea must be entered:
" ... by one fully aware of the direct consequences,
including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor or his own
counsel ... " Id. at 755.
Such a plea will stand unless "... induced by threats,
... misrepresentations, ... or (improper) promises ... "
Id. The fact that the guilty plea was encouraged by the
possibility of a lighter sentence is not improper. The
restrictions upon the State are that:
" ... the agents of the State may not produce a
plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by
mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant." Id. at 750.
A further requirement to a voluntary guilty plea is
the requirement that the record show affirmatively that
the defendant who pled guilty did so voluntarily. Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed.
2d 274 (1969).

7

An examination of the present case will show that
the appellant pied guilty voluntarily at his trial. Appellant admits that the trial judge questioned him at the
time he entered his plea to establish that he was aware
of his constitutional rights and that he was voluntarily
waiving them to enter his plea of guilty. This is also established in the record (Exhibit 1-P, pp. 6, 7). The court
was assured that the appellant knew the nature of the
charge against him and the consequences of his guilty
plea (Exhibit 1-P, 5-7). Specifically, appellant assured
the court that he realized the possibility of probation
was entirely within the discretion of the trial judge and
that if the trial judge saw fit a sentence of one to twenty
years could be imposed (Exhibit 1-P, pp. 5, 7). And,
lastly, appellant stated no improper promises or coercion
had been used to induce his plea (Exhibit 1-P, pp. 5, 6).
It is appellant's position that while the record indicates his plea was given voluntarily as required in Brady,
supra, and Boykin, supra, his plea was actually involuntary. He claims his counsel promised he would receive
probation by pleading guilty and thus influenced him
against his own feelings on the matter to plead guilty
(R. 45, 46). This was clearly denied by his counsel, Mr.
Edmonds, at the habeas corpus hearing (R. 40, 41). An
examination of appellant's testimony at the same hearing
also indicates that he was aware of the likelihood of being
convicted of the felony charges against him (R. 45). His
major concern was not the possibility of acquittal on the
charges against him, but the taking advantage of bail and
his desire to "stay out as long as possible" (R. 46). The
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decision to plead guilty was made with appellant's approval and as a result another charge pending against him
was dismissed (R. 52).
In light of these facts, it is reasonable to conclude
that the decision to plead guilty was made on the likelihood that there was little possibility of acquittal, the
desire to limit the penalties which might have been imposed, and the possibility that the appellant might receive
probation. These motivating factors are all proper. Brady
v. United States, supra, at 752. Appellant's present contention that the promise of probation was the motivating
factor is unsupported. The lower court properly exercised their prerogative to not believe the appellant's testimony on this matter. Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294,
295, 452 P. 2d 323, 324 (1969). Undoubtedly, appellant's
trial counsel, Mr. Edmonds, advised him as to the possibility of probation. This was proper. The fact that it
was not realized does not make his guilty plea vulnerable
to attack.

"A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea
merely because he discovers . . . (he has) misapprehended ... the likely penalties attached to
alternative courses of action." Brady v. U. S.,
supra, at 757.
Respondents submit therefore that appellant's plea was
voluntary.
The appellant's second contention, whether or not
his plea was given intelligently, can also be tested by the
decision in Brady v. United States, supra. To be given
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intelligently it must be shown that when the appellant
pled guilty:
"He was advised by competent counsel, he was
made aware of the nature of the charge against
him, and there was nothing to indicate that he
was incompetent or otherwise not in control of his
mental facilities." Id. at 756.
Appellant has not challenged the competency of his
counsel nor has he claimed ignorance of the nature of the
charge against him. Apparently his only contention is
that due to his lack of education he was incompetent to
correctly assess his counsel's advice and decide what
was in his best interest. Again this contention is unsupported. Appellant was in control of his mental facilities
at the time he pled guilty (R. 6). In his schooling, he
had reached the tenth grade (R. 6). He had been charged
and convicted of a felony before and was familiar with
the criminal process and his rights therein (R. 6, Exhibit
1-P, p. 8).
The appellant in this case knew "precisely" what he
was doing. The trial court satisfied itself that the plea
of guilty was voluntarily and intelligently made by a competent defendant with adequate advice of counsel and
there was nothing to question the accuracy and reliability
of the appellant's admissions. See Brady v. United States,
supra, at 758.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant has failed to show that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction. He has also failed to show that his
guilty plea was not given voluntarily and intelligently.
To the contrary, the recard shows his plea was given voluntarily and intelligently. Therefore, respondents request
that the lower court's decision be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

